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Suffocation and the logic of immunopolitics 
Benoît Dillet (University of Bath) 
 
When a transhumanist wants to change his body, like in 
bio-art (Stelarc), believing that the human is “obsolete,” it 
is certainly possible that waste material appears in place of 
what is rejected – a deject (an object of rejection). But 
trans-jets are unconstructible. In the notion of trans-jet 
[trajet], the root trans- does not refer to the capacity to do 
whatever one wants according to whatever ends, it is the 
incredible apparition of a creation that shatters all 
prevision. Trans- as transi/t… Contrary to the concept of 
subject, trans-jet implies the passage of time throughout 
places. 
–– Frédéric Neyrat, Atopies. 
 
 
0. The Immunopolitics Vignette 
The recent election of Donald Trump, the numerous referenda in Europe (including Brexit), 
the problem of immigration and refugees in Europe and the new hopes for a culture of protest 
have challenged the status quo and urged professional political theorists to comment on, 
analyse and address the new political reality shaped by these earthquakes.1 These shocks were 
co-produced in part by a re-organisation of the material production of knowledge, 
information, news, as well as state action. Ten years after the invention of Facebook and 
YouTube, populist discourses have found new forms, from viral videos to push-notifications 
and suggested content. The Web giants have made this possible, and are benefiting from these 
new, highly charged affective spaces. The enormous concentration of power by these new 
tech companies should lead us to reconsider the “biopolitical paradigm” what is taking place 
alongside the re-structuring of power relations is an acceleration of the politics of emotion, 
identity and story-telling that dominate the media to a point of saturation and suffocation. The 
bodies of the governed have been damaged by the economic and affective violence pouring 
out from a politics of avoidance and security against otherness. 
In many ways, the multi-faceted debate, or shall we say “field”, on biopolitics, 
biopower and bioethics has prefigured some of the questions that are now at the forefront of 
the dark futures of capitalism. As these tech companies develop new services to solve 
problems that were not thinkable a few years ago, they have managed to colonise life in 
unprecedented ways. Medicine and law are now seen as new markets for these new giants 
armed with algorithms, data centres, cloud services, chatbots and machine-learning gadgets. 
This techno-dystopian vectorialist class disrupts management practices and produces 
new forms of enslavement. But what is particularly relevant for us is to examine how all this 
is taking place by the laying down of an “immunopolitics”, a term used by Frédéric Neyrat as 
an extension of Roberto Esposito’s scholarly work from the early 2000s. Immunopolitics is 
the permanent demand for preventive measures in the search of a total immunisation from 
others, bacteria, terrorism, problems, or simply, negativity. But more crucially for us, beyond 
                                                      
1 I would like thank Greg Bird and Hannah Richter for their thoughtful and perceptive comments on this chapter. 
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the logic of scapegoating and avoidance that dominates the contemporary discourse, 
immunopolitics also takes place at the bio-economic, technological and ecological level. In 
addition to the life instinct and the death drive central to a psychoanalytical framework, 
Neyrat (2011, 108) adds a third drive that he calls the “drive to remain untouched” (la pulsion 
de l’indemne). It is the vital tendency towards an intact condition and inertia. Immunopolitics 
takes from this third drive by developing political strategies to operationalise it at the macro-
level. While our hyper-connected world is dominated by networks, leaks, entanglements and 
fluxes, a large infrastructure is being created to immunise against risks of contagion. This 
chapter intends to connect the literature and the question of biopolitics to that of 
immunopolitics. Immunopolitics rests on a dual process of a complete protection on the one 
hand, and absolute distancing of undesirables on the other: 
In place of bonds of community based on reciprocity, interaction and mutual expression of 
human relations, we would see kinds of “auto-spheres,” “intangible bodies,” via a 
“distancing of the other.” This production of intangibles is based on a biopolitical split, 
leaving to one side untouchables, pariahs, “disposable men” (Bertrand Ogilvie’s term), the 
poor, immigrants, and undocumented aliens, who would be related to detention centers, 
prisons, or hospitals. Immunized on one side of this split, exposed on the other. (Neyrat 
2011, 110) 
The externalisation of other forms of life in the process of immunisation is thus crucial 
to the reproduction of life, and the renewal of biopolitics. Transhumanism for instance is a 
doctrine particularly in fashion with Silicon Valley gurus (or “thought-leaders”), it claims that 
life can and should be enhanced to adapt to the new challenges that humanity faces. Life and 
technics have become one for them, by collapsing the terms of nature/culture but also 
nature/technics. In the introductory epigraph, Neyrat questions whether the new subjectivity 
that transhumanists want to put forward should not be called “deject” instead of “subject” 
given that the ultimate horizon of the techno-populists could very well be natural and human 
waste rather than super-humans. The question of trans-formation is crucial to biopolitics since 
it involves different understandings of life.2 
According to Neyrat’s important recent work, one of the main impetuses of the 
collective inertia in face of global climate change and the drive to remain untouched is the 
residual humanism and productivism found in posthumanism, transhumanism and other 
doctrines. The protagonists of these recent intellectual movements, who write after nature and 
after the human, continue to argue for the self-production of humanity and use modern 
definitions of the human as production or poiesis. Beyond the logic of immunopolitics, Neyrat 
(2017) argues instead for an ecology of separation. At the end of my chapter I will come back 
to this emphasis on separation and explain why it is crucial for renewing the biopolitical and 
the geophilosophical paradigms. I will tackle the geological unconscious of biopolitics, in 
showing how our conception of the living and its management by contemporary biopower are 
changing in our Anthropocenic times. 
 
1. Life after Sovereignty? 
The immense success of Michel Foucault’s notions of biopolitics and biopower has had the 
advantage of bringing questions about life and the body, but also the inorganic, nonlife and 
death to the centre of some theoretical discussions. Foucault’s concept of biopolitics has led 
                                                      
2 Bernard Stiegler notes that trance as a collective state of dreaming is fundamental to psychic and collective 
transformations: “trans-forming oneself can occur (and, even, can only occur) in complete unconsciousness, in 
assuming the unconsciousness (the improbability) necessitated by this trance [transe], so to speak” (2016, 132). 
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to a proliferation of neologisms such as thanatopolitics, necropolitics, neuropolitics, 
neuropower, psychopower, geopower and so on. By the time Foucault’s work was not only 
read by professional political theorists, but by graduate students all around the world, the 
notion of biopolitics had started to be hailed as his most political and indeed politicised 
notion. Giorgio Agamben famously borrowed the notion for his own philosophical project of 
Homo Sacer and turned it into his own weapon by associating the biopolitical regime of 
modernity with the use of camps and the logic of exclusion. Agamben was struck by 
Foucault’s non-engagement with Hannah Arendt’s work and most importantly the absence in 
Foucault’s analysis of “the exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration camp 
and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century” (Agamben 1998, 4). 
Similarly, Achille Mbembe (2003) has pursued Foucault’s concept of biopower on other 
terrains in extremely productive ways. For him biopolitics is not only a regulation and 
management of life through the technologies of power such as birth rates, mortality rates and 
the development of modern statistics as part of the state apparatus. It is above all a 
government of death through colonial and postcolonial logics that made humans commodities 
and provided the framework for contemporary forms of exploitation. 
Thus, the notion of biopolitics has become not only a concept but a scheme of thought 
and a mode of understanding. Biopolitics is not a paradigm in the humanities and social 
sciences, but a scheme of thought that has allowed to overcome the abstract perspectives that 
hold sovereignty as central notions (Goldstone 2014). Many important studies on the 
biological classification of populations or on biotechnologies of reproduction used this 
scheme of thought. The opposition between sovereignty and biopolitics continues to dominate 
contemporary studies in biopolitics, which in turn demonstrates the lasting legacy of 
Foucault’s thought given that this opposition was written in the DNA of this concept.3 The 
concept of sovereignty took an imperious dimension in 20th century political thought and is 
constantly re-habilitated in the 21st century: “sovereignty” appears at the same time as a 
problem and its solution, a question and its answer. The relative stability of this scheme of 
thought is surprising given the dark episodes of history from the 17th century onwards – I am 
taking Hobbes’ Leviathan and the Treaty of Westphalia as epitomes. 
Thus some philosophers called for a renewal of the political discourse to find new 
conditions of possibility and impossibility. Foucault noted that it was long overdue for 
political theorists to cut off the king’s head. But Roberto Esposito is probably the political 
philosopher who has voiced this concern most explicitly. Indeed, he notes that after the 9/11 
attacks and the rise of security discourse (or sometimes called “securitisation”), a new 
political language is required and points to Foucault’s concept of biopower as this attempt to 
found this new thinking. To Esposito, traditional political concepts such as sovereignty, 
rights, democracy, representation, liberty and the individual have become inapt to understand 
the mutation of current politics. He writes, 
traditional political categories, such as order, but also freedom, take on meaning that 
forces them ever more toward the shelter of security measures. Freedom, for example, 
ceases to be understood as participation in the political management of the polis and is 
now recast in terms of personal security along a fault line that follows us to this very 
moment. (Esposito 2013, 70) 
This imperative of putting “personal security” at the forefront of all politics leads Esposito to 
elaborate his extremely useful couple of community/immunity, centred on the notion of the 
munus (obligation or debt in Latin). This couple refers to two different fields: (1) the politico-
                                                      
3 Hannah Richter discussed this aspect in the introduction in relation to the two bodies of the king in Ernst 
Kantorowicz. 
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legal domain organised around private property and restraints imposed on political agency; 
(2) the biomedical domain centred on immunology studies and practices, like inoculation. I 
will come back to the conceptual origin of immunity in the next section, but for now it is 
worth remembering that this conceptual distinction is inseparable from Esposito’s lucid 
reading of biopolitics as the knot binding politics and life together: 
Contrary to the illusions of those who imagined it was possible to retroactively skip 
over what for them amounted to the Nazi parenthesis so as to reconstruct the governing 
principles of the preceding period, life and politics are bound together in a knot that 
can’t be undone. (Esposito 2013, 75) 
He notes that political philosophers all too often skip over Nazism and the redefinition of 
politics by Hitlerism, and pretend traditional concepts can be used as if they were 
transhistorical or ahistorical functions. Many theorists who analyse the life and politics knot 
unconsciously re-inscribe it within the frameworks of prohibition and sovereign violence. 
“The problem is that sovereignty is a fiction whose basic function, by definition, has been to 
subsume all other fictions” (Goldstone 2014, 106). As a consequence, historical periods filled 
with struggles were largely overlooked. By moving from sovereignty (as a scheme of thought) 
to biopolitics, Esposito almost apologises for studying Nazism as a coherent political 
philosophy (following Emmanuel Levinas’ famous and important article from 1934 [Levinas 
1990]). He notes that, if we were to take seriously the relations between life and politics, we 
need to account for Nazism as a turning point in biopolitics. Foucault himself discussed the 
role of race and racist discourse in biopolitics as new political objects in his 1976 lectures 
Society Must Be Defended.4 In this set of lectures, Foucault mainly points to the inherent 
racism found in socialist states. He argued that socialist states and socialist thought also make 
used of biopower, but that in using this new form of power, they have pursued racist politics. 
Much like for his 1979 lectures on neoliberalism, where he argued that the Left needs to 
create a Leftist form of governmentality (Foucault 2008, 92-4), Foucault never abhorred 
biopower or thought naively that we could step out of biopower so easily. He knew full well 
the advantages of the biopolitical scheme of thought, the link to the welfare state and the 
improvement of people’s health. Hence, his last question of this lecture series is to imagine a 
biopolitics freed of racism.5 This question is taken up again by Esposito in his book Bíos 
when thinking an “affirmative biopolitics”, a concept of life freed from racism. 
 Numerous scholars have used the “biopolitical paradigm” to study the state apparatus, 
but they often failed to historicise the use of life in politics and examine in some detail the 
role of this concept played in slavery, colonial projects, in overtly racial societies as well as in 
ecological catastrophes and biotechnological innovations. Esposito is right to pose that while 
the constitutive/transcendental category of Marxism is history, for Nazism it is biology. But 
he is perhaps too quick to think that sovereignty and rights discourses can be overcome so 
easily by blindly following Foucault.6 
                                                      
4 For instance, Foucault defined racism as “a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the 
break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). 
5 Robert Bernasconi (2015) traces Georges Canguilhem’s silence on the relation between science and racism in a 
fascinating way. Although this is probably unintentional given his well-known commitment to the French 
resistance during the Second World War, his uncritical use of Kurt Goldstein and Jacob Baron von Uexküll’s 
conceptions of the environment (as Umwelt and Milieu) makes this silence particularly problematic given their 
racial politics. 
6 “Biopolitics is primarily that which is not sovereignty” (Esposito 2008, 33). This is surprising, since for 
Foucault, the reader of Bataille (but also Esposito’s reading of Bataille and Nancy), sovereignty is not reduced to 
the legal lexicon and can include the impersonal as well as the affirmative biopolitics that Esposito is imagining. 
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 Arguably, the biopolitical paradigm has led to radically new problems in terms of 
management of the living, away from older concerns of survival and obedience. This shift has 
taken place both at the level of governmental/state practice as well as at the theoretical level. 
Indeed, the discredit of Marxist philosophy of history since the 1970s and the regain of 
interest in vitalist strands participate in the actuality of this line of thinking. This was also 
partly due to the fundamental change of time and temporality in politics. We find that with the 
advent of the biopolitical paradigm (in theory and practice), there is a forgetting of history. 
 Totalising systems of thought (that used these traditional concepts that we previously 
listed but also make constant references to the universal and the particular, or to history and 
spirit) became quickly outdated and rendered inoperative to account for a real that constantly 
displaces itself. Political projects were being largely challenged by the vast forces of capital – 
but not only. The immense energies of restructuration made demands on an increasingly 
proletarianised population to continuously adapt to new prerogatives, cancelling or 
interrupting all possibilities to plan the future or to organise alternatives. In these neoliberal 
times, the only common denominator was therefore life: life became the centre of all 
contemporary politics, but given that life was an object and subject largely unaccounted for in 
political philosophy, a new type of political epistemology therefore needed to emerge. With 
the development of biotechnologies, especially reproductive medicine and human genetics, 
life became a new market to exploit and a new domain to regulate, legally and ethically 
(Waldby and Cooper 2008). Thus, from the 1970s onwards which saw the disappearance of 
the proletarian and class politics, a shift to life became prominent. The understanding of 
normality and health changed with the transformation of medicine, and the new burgeoning 
field of bioethics was set up to organise public debates on these issues – with limited success.7 
 
2.  Biopolitics at work: from immunity to immunopolitics 
 This new political vocabulary – that Esposito is working with and working towards – 
has a longer genealogy in post-1945 continental philosophy. Indeed, Esposito’s 
deconstruction of the political could not have been thinkable – if it is thinkable at all – 
without this philosophical community that worked at a vitalist philosophy against dialectical 
thought after 1945.8 These new modes of thinking often attempted to account for 
discontinuities, fragments and events rather than long-term structures and continuities. Yet, 
this knot between life and politics is impossible to unravel, since when politics has come to 
manage and organise life, it cannot simply be undone. Esposito’s new vocabulary (biopolitics, 
immunity, community) is crucial to grasp what is at stake the logic of immunopolitics 
introduced in the first section. 
 Concepts such as biopolitics, immunity, community are not transcendental concepts that 
attempt to found a pure morality, with universal pretence, but function locally and 
historically. By navigating between the concepts of biopolitics, immunity, community and 
existential territories, we can avoid the strict oppositional thinking of the 
                                                      
7 “It is safe to say, then, that since the 1970s ‘life’ has become a reference point for political thinking and 
political action in two respects. On the one hand, we can say the human ‘environment’ is threatened by the 
existing social economic structures and that policy-makers need to find the right answers to the ecological 
question and to secure the conditions of life on Earth and the survival of humanity. On the other hand, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to know, because of bioscientific discoveries and technological innovations, 
what exactly the “natural foundations” of life are and how these can be distinguished from “artificial” forms of 
life”. (Lemke 2011, 27) 
8 For a short overview of the deconstruction of traditional political categories in the work of Foucault see also 
Judith Revel (2009). 
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immunity/community couple. The path between the task of describing and the task of marking 
a world is a narrow one. Only on this path is there a possibility to add more terms: to take into 
consideration new factors and variables, but also to craft new political concepts. 
 Intuitively, we would think that if immunity is the present condition of our time that 
Esposito invites us to critique, community then stands as the positive (and only?) contender to 
replace it. Yet, things get murkier since there is a long tradition in liberal thought that opposes 
the individual to the community. The notion of “community” is often problematically reduced 
to a liberal communitarian meaning, in which sharing, in an undifferentiated way, ends up 
constructing a “wider subjectivity”, as Esposito (2010, 2) aptly refers to it.9 Discourses on the 
community come from a nostalgic yearning for an idealised community that never was, but 
somehow is thought to have existed. Both Jean-Luc Nancy, in his famous book The 
Inoperative Community published in 1991 (the article was originally published in 1983), and 
Esposito, in his 1998 work Communitas, begin their books by making a distinction between 
the liberal conception of community and a deconstructive understanding of the term.10 Both 
philosophers thus expose the repetitive impulse contained in regretting the dislocation of an 
ideal community that never was. But this repetitive impulse is not only a foundational part of 
liberal thought, it is also widely shared as a constitutive principle in some sociological studies 
that are loosely inspired by Marxist or critical theory. Geoffroy de Lagasnerie (2012) is right 
that neoliberalism is often misunderstood when it is simply denounced by sociologists as a 
negative force (deregulation, disorder, decomposition, destruction, separation and atomisation 
of social life). This negative force is then often opposed to the necessity of social cohesion 
and collective power. 
 Biopolitics, much like neoliberalism, is not the dislocation of a previously tied unity, 
but the redistribution of conceptual and practical terms in politics. It is not in itself 
conservative or oppressive or productive of change, it is a new operation to classify and 
manage biological, social and technical life. To put it differently, biopolitics and 
neoliberalism are often thought in terms of lack, but Foucault taught us to analyse instead the 
productive aspects of these new governmental rationalities. Foucault asks us to think through 
these rationalities before we can even think of dismantling them. While biopolitics is partly 
tied to new governmental practices, institutional innovations and new prerogatives (concerned 
with birth, mortality rates, health, disease, hygiene and so on), these practices cannot be 
examined independently of the breakthroughs in biology with the “discoveries” of the genome 
and the DNA in 1962 and 1965 respectively. As Giuseppe Bianco and Miguel de Beistegui 
noted, these results and advances in molecular biology challenged the old doctrine of vitalism 
together with the old concept of life: 
If, after the discovery of DNA, and in the eyes of the positivist biologists such as Jacob, 
Monod and Lwoff, the concept of life was no longer necessary, Foucault’s claim is that 
it did not yet exist in the eighteenth century. The life of life itself unfolds between that 
no longer, which marks the ‘death’ of a concept, and the not yet, which signals its birth. 
Jacob and Monod claimed that life was a useless concept in biology, Foucault was more 
nuanced and suggested that the historical transcendental, or the episteme, which 
dominated Western culture for 150 years – and in which a specific conception of life, 
                                                      
9 The phrase is originally from the liberal communitarian political philosopher Michael Sandel. 
10 “The gravest and most painful testimony of the modern world, the one that possibly involves all other 
testimonies to which this epoch must answer (by virtue of some unknown decree or necessity, for we bear 
witness also to the exhaustion of thinking through History), is the testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or 
the conflagration of community”. (Nancy 1991, 1)  
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labour and language played a major role – was probably destined to change. (Bianco 
and de Beistegui 2015, 3) 
While Foucault diagnosed the end of man in The Order of Things in 1966, following Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s famous statements about the dissolution of “man” as an operative category in 
anthropology, the same Foucault 10 years later introduced the notions of biopolitics and 
biopower in relation to political economy and the state’s increasing concern in people’s health 
(Lemm and Vatter 2014). The core of the regime of sovereignty and sovereign power from 
the 17th century until the end of the 18th century was an “anatomo-politics” of the governed 
body. With biopower, normalisation and the use of public statistics in the modern state 
institutions, the core moved to a biopolitics of population or species-being. The subject of 
politics has therefore changed from the human body to the population. 
 The obsolescence of the notion of life in molecular biology – replaced by the emphasis 
on message or code, borrowed from cybernetics – did not eradicate the notion from the other 
fields of inquiry, quite the contrary. In assessing the revolutions in molecular biology and the 
life sciences, Georges Canguilhem argued that this change of language and perspective did 
not take into consideration the “subject of the knowledge of life”: the biologist (François 
Jacob) “ignores the subject who is posing the question” (Bianco and de Beistegui 2015, 6). 
This is where the work of the philosopher (Foucault) is crucial since it focuses on the 
normative power (or “normalisation”) at play in the changes of conception of life in ethics, 
biology as well as in politics, particularly with the creation of the welfare state. New 
definitions of life in life sciences have also consequences on politics and ethics; for instance, 
the biologist Jacques Monod “introduce[d] the category of teleonomy and want[ed] to deduce 
an ethics from biology” (Bianco and de Beistegui 2015, 6). In short, while governmental 
agencies and political theorists have attempted to rethink the management of life 
institutionally but also ethically, some molecular biologists like Jacob and Monod wanted to 
show the political and ethical relevance of their work. Revolutions in biology made the 
discipline the royal science and biological metaphors were increasingly used in social 
sciences and in policies to align with this progress. This move was for instance supported by 
the increasing rhetoric of the “self-organisation” of financial markets, partly by equating 
organisms, complex systems and impersonal rationality (Connolly 2013). However, as 
Catherine Malabou (2016) has recently argued, political theorists have an anti-biological bias. 
They continue to oppose the “natural body” to “symbolic life”, failing to see the 
differentiating possibilities of the living, deconstructing the understanding of the living as 
“programme”. To her, even Foucault and Agamben fail to account for “the revolutionary 
discoveries of molecular and cellular biology”, in particular the operating categories of 
epigenesis and cloning, which “are the very ones able to renew the political question” 
(Malabou 2016, 431).11 This is where Esposito’s concept of immunity in relation to 
community allows us to think the differentiating relations between life and politics. 
 His concept of immunity owes to Nancy’s work on community. It is worth 
remembering that Nancy’s understanding of community as Mitsein (being-with) draws 
directly from Heidegger, who had already surpassed the liberal metaphysics of subjectivity 
with his concept of Dasein (being-there). For Nancy, community is not a collection of 
                                                      
11 Malabou concludes that the recent breakthroughs in molecular and cellular biology offer a power of resistance 
to biopolitics “in asserting the coincidence of the symbolic and the biological. There is but one life, one life 
only” (2016, 438). This is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is necessary to briefly show the limits of 
Malabou’s own argument that verges on neurocentrism and biological reductionism. Malabou excludes de jure 
the technological question, looking for the way life repairs itself without having recourse to prostheses, grafting 
techniques and other incursions of the inorganic, assuming that the body can operate a kind of self-
deconstruction of its programme and identity by actualising the new biological potentials.  
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individuals or a totality, but a being understood as a movement towards the other: a 
clinamen.12 What defines community for Nancy is ecstasy, this experience of being outside of 
oneself, or in other words, the forces of this outside that is nothing other than the rejection of 
an impossible interiority” (Nancy 1991, 4). Community is not a territory and space shared in 
common but the experience of sharing. This experience is itself enough to weave relations 
and “incompletion is its principle” (Nancy 1991, 35). 
 The notion of immunity then serves not only to associate the liberal-communitarian 
term of community with the desire to form a new immune system of enclaves and ethnos, and 
therefore reversing the very notion of community into immunity, but also to show that what is 
at stake is the entanglement of the munus, translated as obligation or debt. In his book 
Immunitas, Esposito traces the origin of the term “immunity” from the Latin immunitas or 
immunis as what negates or lacks the munus, where munus refers to “an office – a task, 
obligation, duty (also in the sense of a gift to be repaid)” (2011, 5). Thus, communitas is in the 
first instance the sharing of the munus, while immunitas is the exemption from the 
obligation.13 This philological coup opens up a new field of inquiry for political philosophy. 
To simplify Esposito’s argument to the extreme, we can say that community centres on the 
social life of debt, while the protection and negation of obligations define his notion of 
immunity. We should note that this is not primarily debt in an economic sense, but a debt 
from the anthropological perspective, necessary to social relations. But much like Nietzsche’s 
own commentaries on debt, this anthropological perspective can be also extended to the 
economic sphere. 
 Hence, immunitas is the condition when someone who does not repay the gift that he 
owes. This immunisation does not simply operate at the level of individuals as “atoms”, but 
also at the level of communities (in the sense of communitarians) and of society in general 
(institutions, generations, and the arts). The challenge for Esposito is therefore to locate the 
processes of subjectivation at work in the socius. These are impersonal singularities but they 
are yet not independent and fully formed, the question then is how do they hang together? 
 Neyrat (2010) borrows the conceptual apparatus of Esposito to think our contemporary 
condition as immunopolitics. The legal definition of immunity is the exemption to the 
common law: a positive norm of exception that is applicable to exceptional legal persons 
(politicians). Immunity is a special protection in the legal system, while in medical terms, the 
immunity system is what protects the body from being affected by a disease. Immunity seems 
at first to mark the separation between an inside and an outside but it is important to note that 
for both Esposito and Neyrat, immunity is what is exempted from otherness and the outside: 
“immunis is he or she who has no obligations toward the other and can therefore conserve his 
or her own essence intact as a subject and owner of himself or herself” (Esposito 2013, 39). 
Hence the new terminology that Esposito was long looking for began maturing with this 
community/immunity dialectic that he mobilises in his work from the 2000s. While Esposito 
refers to broad historical periods and traditions of thought, Neyrat on the other hand allows us 
to think more concretely the emergencies of the world: finance, ecology and technology. 
 Neyrat is the name of a formidable conceptual abstract machine: not a person but the 
metaphysical topos (atopos) from which endless conceptual projections gush out; an abstract 
machine that wants to give back the grandeur of philosophical thinking, by pushing thinking 
                                                      
12 “One cannot make a world with simple atoms. There has to be a clinamen. There has to be an inclination from 
one toward the other, of one by the other, or from one to the other. Community is at least the clinamen of the 
‘individual’”. (Nancy 1991, 4). 
13 The community/immunity dialectic mirrors the improper/proper couple that Esposito also develops (Bird 
2016). 
 9 
to its limits. Globalisation is the project of interconnectedness that paradoxically realises the 
immunological drive or the drive to remain untouched. While we would think that, with 
globalisation, encounters with otherness are more common, for Neyrat it is nothing other than 
the closing of the outside: an exophobia. In many ways, his philosophical thought continues 
that of Esposito’s affirmative philosophy (the impersonal, affirmative biopolitics) as well as 
Nancy’s more recent work on politics and democracy, which I will now turn to.14 But Neyrat 
does this by operationalising the speculative movements of both thought to concrete 
problems: especially global climate change. Given the ecological emergencies, the only realist 
move is to develop a speculative thought. I will explain why this is also connected to Neyrat’s 
own conception of “saturated immanence” (everything is in flux, everything is turned into 
flows of images, capital, and other commodified “bits”). 
 
3. Singularities and the Politics of Separation 
 What does this have to do with biopolitics? Existence means to stand outside of the self, 
Neyrat reminds us. Thus the project of producing differences for the existence has 
consequences for biopolitics. The refusal and exclusion of all otherness and outsides (what he 
calls “exophobia”) from the liberal ontology means that there is no room for developing ex-
centric existential territories. Neyrat suggests moving “from a politics over life to a politics of 
life” (Esposito 2013, 77; Neyrat 2010, 36). Esposito’s answer was to find a third term (the 
impersonal) beyond the person-subject (“I”) as well as the infinite ethical demands of the 
other (“You”). Esposito’s project of an affirmative biopolitics is based on life as an 
impersonal force, “creating an opening to a set of forces that push it beyond its logical, and 
even grammatical boundaries” (Esposito 2012, 14). Rather than being a critique of the state of 
affairs, the impersonal is a tradition of thought, according to him, that can be recovered 
against a biopolitics that turns into a thanatopolitics, that is when a biopolitics defines life too 
strictly. Thanatopolitics and negative biopolitics begin when only a specific type of life (the 
proper one) can be accepted. To give content to this impersonality Esposito examines in detail 
three forms of the impersonal in Third Person: universal justice (in Simone Weil), writing 
(Maurice Blanchot) and life (Gilles Deleuze). Malabou would argue on the contrary that 
defecting resistance to an external impersonality fails to recognise the auto-affection and self-
deconstruction contained within the structure of the living (its “plasticity”). Malabou’s notion 
of plasticity can come close to Esposito’s own conceptualisation of the immune system as ‘the 
ever-changing product of a dynamic, competitive interaction with the environment rather than 
a definitive and inalterable given’ (Esposito 2011, 166). It is not always clear in Esposito how 
his work on the impersonal fits within his immunity/community dialectic that we previously 
discussed.  
 Malabou is right to both critique the opposition between biological and symbolic life 
and emphasise an enriched and dynamic conception of life, that for instance account for the 
self-repairing capacities of the body. Yet as I noted earlier, Malabou does not see the 
technical life of humans, the transductive relations of the bios with both technē and geos. But 
this is also the case in Esposito’s meditations on the impersonal. Indeed, what is often missing 
from Esposito is the question of technology, except when he turns in Immunitas to 
biotechnologies and medicine. It is precisely because the definition of immunity is widely 
accepted as the production of antibodies or any other immunological reaction by an organism 
                                                      
14 Greg Bird (2016, 155) usefully writes about the main divergence between Esposito and Nancy: “both insist 
that if there is a major point of contention, it is where each places their emphasis: Nancy focuses on the cum, 
while Esposito the munus”. Neyrat (2013, 25) uses the term “Co-Oriented Ontology” to define Nancy’s thought, 
as a response to the famous Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO). 
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against foreign materials or anything that is not part of that organism, that biology and politics 
have found a common ground. The “dispositif of immunisation” is the edge of the spectrum 
that constantly threatens contemporary politics, by the promise of a sufficient amount of 
protection that can prevent foreign bodies from attacking. Thus when he refers to 
biotechnologies, he remains at the level of metaphors to demonstrate the porosity between the 
biological language and the political lexicon. What he cannot think is the technicity of the 
human, especially in relation to nonhumans and the Earth system. Nancy, Stiegler and Gilbert 
Simondon have taught us that the contemporary form of life is the negotiation between nature 
and technics. This is a radical displacement from a humanist and modernist perspective: 
Politics is thus implicitly nothing other than the auto-management of ecotechnology, the 
only form of possible “auto”-nomy that precisely no longer has recourse to any 
heretofore possible forms of a politics: neither the self-founding “sovereignty,” since it 
is no longer a matter of founding, nor the “discussion concerning the justice” of an 
Aristotelian polis, since there is no longer a polis, nor even the contestation or the 
differend, since living and power go in the same direction according to an asymptomatic 
consensus and devoid of finality, or of truth. 
The term biopolitics in fact designates neither life (as the form of life) nor politics (as a 
form of coexistence). And we can certainly admit that in fact we are no longer in a 
position to use either of these terms in any of their ordinary senses. Both are, rather, 
henceforth subject to what carries them together into ecotechnology. (Nancy 2007, 94) 
In this text on globalisation from 2002, Nancy presents a rare assertiveness in alerting us to 
the emergence of a new condition: general equivalence. The ills of capitalism consist in 
killing off the creative aspects of singularities and sense. The capitalist ontology interrupts 
“world-forming” processes (le faire-monde in French) by reducing all things and beings to the 
same common denominator (exchange-value).15 For Nancy, singularities are thus defined in 
the negative. For instance enjoyment is a “shared appropriation… of what cannot be 
accumulated or what is not equivalent, that is, of value itself (or of meaning) in the singularity 
of its creation” (Nancy 2007, 46). The creation of a world through the production of 
singularities which are not productive or accumulatable is “the greatest risk that humanity has 
had to confront” (Nancy 2007, 53), but it is also a “task that can only be a struggle”, a 
struggle of the West against itself. In short, for Nancy, what the discourse on biopolitics does 
not want to take into account is the “becoming-technical of the world” – or ecotechnics – and 
this is essential since the body itself is characterised as essentially plastic and technical 
(Cortés Lagunas 2012). This becoming-technical of the world should be confronted by a 
politics of singularities as well as “separation”, as we will see with Neyrat. 
 The power of Neyrat’s work is to have integrated Nancy’s concerns about the 
becoming-technical of the world and the critique general equivalence as “integral humanism” 
and “saturated immanence”. The problem with biopolitics, which is in fact an ecotechnical 
power, is not globalisation as such, but “hominisation” as a process (Neyrat 2015a, 23). 
Hominisation began with the first cave paintings more than 30,000 years ago, but even earlier 
than that (2 to 3 million years ago) there were other forms of symbolisation that modified both 
the physical strata of the Earth as well as the socio-psychic strata of the humans as species-
being (Stiegler 2017, 50). In this sense, an inquiry into ecotechnics leads us to questions about 
palaeoanthropology or even palaeopolitics, since the production of artefacts and technical 
objects is constitutive of the processes of hominisation in “deep history”. These artefacts are 
themselves processes of symbolisation that constantly modify hominisation. Biopolitics and 
                                                      
15 ‘Capitalism exposes the inverted form of an absolute and singular value through general equivalence’ (Nancy 
2007: 120). 
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ecotechnics are therefore, for Neyrat, consequences of a broader movement that he calls 
“integral humanism” – leading him to write that “capitalism is a humanism” (Neyrat 2015a, 
40-2). Philosophers who have argued against the essence of the human or anthropocentrism, 
whether they are humanists, posthumanists, or transhumanists, tend to argue for a residual 
productivism. The human is nothing, but can become anything or anyone, such is the slogan 
of the humanist tradition, revisited by the new spirit of capitalism: the entrepreneur of the self 
is defined by plasticity, flexibility, availability and fluidity, he or she can give himself or 
herself any form. The point is therefore not to argue for passivity or absolute 
consumption/consummation of energy and matter, but to read contemporary philosophical 
discourses in light of the event of the Anthropocene (or Capitalocene). This is precisely the 
new challenge for the biopolitical paradigm, to enter into conversation with the environmental 
humanities and account for the fact that human life has become a geological force. Biopolitics 
needs to resist the exophobia of immunopolitics, this would consist in opposing the 
government of the living and the geological processes of the earth.  
This new epoch is envisaged as an event, and much like modernity is often thought as 
an event and a revolution in thought as well as action. In his last book Defiant Earth, Clive 
Hamilton (2017) argues that although environmental philosophers are writing against 
anthropocentrism to account for nonhuman beings and nature, they have yet to change their 
understanding of the environment to account for the Earth System as an ever-evolving 
complex totality. He uses the German term Erlebnis to refer to this event as a disruptive 
episode, recasting the German romantics and a change in feeling. In these times of 
acceleration, this change in feeling will necessitate new regimes of symbolisation that draw 
from sources other than integral humanism which advocates de-inhibition (Bonneuil and 
Fressoz 2016) and uninjuredness (Neyrat uses the French word indemne). To Hamilton, what 
ecological thought has yet to integrate is that humans have disturbed the functioning of the 
earth and this will result in immense consequences for the adaptation of humans to their new 
habitat and for the survival of many species. It is no longer (only) about protecting the 
environment and working at the micro-level, but about thinking a macro-ecopolitics that 
constantly connects to local problems and cosmotechnics – what Félix Guattari called 
“existential territories”. Guattari voiced this concern about global climate change as an event 
in a different vocabulary in 1989, when Earth system science was in its embryonic state: 
Throughout history and across the world existential cartographies founded on a conscious 
acceptance of certain ‘existentializing’ ruptures of meaning have sought refuge in art and 
religion. However, today the huge subjective void produced by the proliferating 
production of material and immaterial goods is becoming ever more absurd and 
increasingly irreparable and threatens the consistency of both individual and group 
existential Territories. (Guattari 2000, 46) 
Now more than ever, nature cannot be separated from culture; in order to comprehend the 
interactions between ecosystems, the mechanosphere and the social and individual 
Universes of reference, we must learn to think ‘transversally’. (Guattari 2000, 43) 
This transversal thinking prefigures Hamilton’s call for a revolution of feeling, while his 
emphasis on existential territories recalls our earlier analyses of the “creation of a world” in 
Nancy (a process interrupted by the general equivalence and the flat ontology of capitalism). 
Guattari forged the concept of “existential territories” to think precisely of the creative 
processes of producing relations between singularities at the psychic and social levels. In this 
geological turn of political theory, in which geopower has trumped biopower as the focus, the 
very meaning of life that we discussed at the beginning of this chapter has also changed. 
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 Hamilton notes that the modernist scheme of thought continues to see nature as a 
loving and nurturing agent (Mother Nature) instead of following Bruno Latour and other 
geoscientists who conceive nature as “Gaia”, a vindictive and revengeful Greek goddess: 
Our understanding of the Earth we inhabit is undergoing a radical change. The modern 
ideas of the Earth as the environment in which humans make their home, or as a 
knowable collection of ecosystems more or less disturbed by humans, is being replaced 
by the conception of an inscrutable and unpredictable entity with a violent history and 
volatile ‘mood swings.’ Earth System scientists have reached for rough metaphors to 
capture this new idea – images of ‘the wakened giant’ and ‘the ornery beast,’ of Gaia 
‘fighting back’ and seeking ‘revenge,’ a world of ‘angry summers’ and ‘death spirals’. 
(Hamilton 2017, 47) 
Yet as Danielle Sands (2015) argues so convincingly, the problem is that all these metaphors 
and images reproduce gender fantasies from the Holocene: a woman that is angry, revengeful 
and full of “mood swings”. This lack of imagination and creativity prevents us from grasping 
this “unfolding event of colossal proportions” (Hamilton 2017, ix). To be worthy of the global 
climate change as an event would certainly mean to develop a vocabulary and a series of 
concepts that allow us to grasp the immensity of this new geological condition. The 
Anthropocene asks us to answer the question “’what to do’ after ‘having done’” (Baranzoni 
2017). Another point that is difficult to accept in Hamilton’s last book is his plea for a “new 
anthropocentrism” (Hamilton 2017, 50-8) that does not conform to the old humanist 
anthropocentrism. For him, the Earth System thinking challenges the foundation of the 
dominant environmental discourse and its anti-anthropocentrism. Earth System thinking 
accounts for a positive agency – the earth as a complex system – that was missing from most 
strands of environmentalism. 
 Finally, Neyrat’s ecology of separation builds on all these theories and perspectives, 
especially about the role of technologies and technoscientific knowledge in geopower, but 
without attempting to “reset modernity” (Latour) or to bring back anthropocentrism. Neyrat’s 
perspective is much closer to climate justice movements and the tradition of environmental 
justice. He begins with recognising the entanglements of beings and their increasing 
interconnectedness to propose a political ecology that distinguishes between forms and modes 
of existence. The flat ontology of capitalism poses a world without outside, without distance 
and without the “capacity to draw back” (Neyrat 2017, 101): 
To be truly political, to take into consideration the dangers which may threaten us, to 
distinguish between that which humans may construct and that which cannot or should 
not be constructed, to know in what ways it is still possible to use the words “nature” and 
“environment,” to enable the ecosystems to be resilient and to endure the disasters of the 
Anthropocene, ecology must leave space for separation. (Neyrat 2017, 102) 
However, it should be clear that an ecology of separation is not advocating a return to 
essentialism and modern ontological dualisms of nature/culture, nature/artifice, body/spirit, 
man/woman and so on. Neyrat makes the important distinction between separation and split 
or cleavage (clivage): splits do not leave room for interdependence and relations, while 
separations – much like the shared experience of Nancy’s community – are not physical 
exclusions, but relational disjunctions concerned with existential difference (Albernaz 2016). 
Neyrat’s position against new materialists and eco-constructivists is not absolute, but 
instrumental; the critique of the Great Divide was certainly useful but is not enough to think 




In this chapter, I have tried to show three main things. First I argue that the traditional 
opposition between sovereignty and biopower is often artificial, and that sovereignty as a 
scheme of thought is more pervasive than is sometimes accounted for in biopolitical studies. 
Second, I demonstrated how contemporary biopolitics is best thought of as immunopolitics, 
by following the work of Esposito and Neyrat. Modern societies and human collectives have 
changed their relation to the munus, they feel exempted from obligations and duties – and 
equating taxes with a burden is particularly symptomatic of this exemption. As a complement 
to the existing life-affirming and death drives, Neyrat noted that a third drive is central to 
biopolitical rationality: the drive to remain untouched. This drive is further strengthened by a 
large technical, political and financial infrastructure that is created by the increasing 
interconnectedness produced by globalisation. Nancy on the other hand argued that the 
becoming-technical of the world is the dominant feature of globalisation; the biopolitical 
discourse documents this becoming-technical when analysing the management of life, birth 
and mortality rates, reproductive medicine, post-Fordist exploitation of life as affective and 
digital labour and so on. Thus, Nancy poses that biopolitics should be thought in terms of 
ecotechnics instead. Therefore my brief turn to ecology and global climate change, since the 
intersectional politics to come can only take place if it reunites the four axes: race, gender, 
class and nature (Keucheyan 2016, 5). As Esposito’s affirmative biopolitics is rather abstract 
and disconnected from practical politics, particularly the issues of climate change and 
technological disruption, it is then Neyrat’s proposition for an ecology of separation that 
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